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Tile. terms "modern man," "modern age," "modern
consciousness," and "modernity" in general, in recent
Christian theology at any rate, have almost become a
myth. Modern man seems to be a mythical creature who
seems to be haunting the imagination of Christian
theologians, and I think one could make a case, certainly
in the case of Protestantism for the last ~oo years or so, fbr
tile major mental partner of Christian theologians’
thinking as being this mythical figure of modern man. I
think Catholics, for a long time, were not so much
interested in talking to this mythical creature as keeping
him Outside the house, but since Vatican II, Catholics, at
least in the United States and in a number of other
countries I know, seem to have been desperately trying to
follow the Protestant experience as rapidly as they
possibly can, with some interesting consequences that are
not my subject this afternoon. In any case, modern man
has been a very important figure in recent theological
thought. What I find interesting is that so many people
who are theologians or who are interested in religion do
not seem to be aware at all of the enormous problem that
even such a phrase as "modern man" raises. What a
sociologist has to do by virtue of, I suppose, professional
obligation is to look at to what extent this phenomenon of’
modern man - modern consciousness is the term I would
prefer - is at all empirically accessible, and what more
specifically one may be able to say about this creature, his
alleged consciousness, and then his alleged relationship to
religion.
Let me say a few words in very general terms about the
kind of approach that I think sociology must take to
investigate, these issues. Many people who are not in
sociology, and even some people who are, shrink back
from any discussion of phenomena of consciousness in
connection with social-scientific analysis as if human
behaviour were a very inaccessible thing; we can watch
people, we can observe them, but anything that takes place
within the mind is supposedly some sort of subjective
mystery to which perhaps only poets may have access but
which is not the. subject matter for a social-scientific
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’investigation. I think that is a methodologically very fMse
idea. I cannot develop in detailwhy I think this is false; in
some way, it seems to me, consciousness is more readily
accessible than behaviour, because behaviour does not
interpret itself, while consciousness does. In other words,
human beings can be asked what they have in mind and,
while there are always .problems in interpreting their
answers, there is an access, a systematic access, to l~uman
consciousness. The sociologist, obviously, is not the only
person who looks at phenomena of consciousness. A
psychologist does. In many ways every Social science does
- even the economist asks questions of motive and
expectation and so forth, which are things which have to
do with the consciousness of the individual. What I think
is peculiarly sociological is that one looks at any particular
structui~e of consciousness in relation to specific
institutional processes, and this is precisely what it seems
to me the sociologist must do when he deals with the
phenomena of modernity and modern consciousness.
Modernity, I would suggest to you, is an aggregate of
institutional processes and processes of consciousness.
Take a very simple example, an example that does not deal
with religion specifically. Take the situation in this room-
as good an example as any- it is always good to begin
where you are. I am literally dropped into this situation
from the air; I have never been iri Dublin before; I did not
know, I regret to say, the existence of this Institute before I
was invited to speak here. Yet it is no effort whatsoever for
me to immediately get up here and do my performance as
if I were back home in Boston. Now why is this ? Forget
about the fact that this is an English-speaking country and
I do not have any language difficulties. If I were in a
different country, there would be a slight technical
problem of translation and so forth, but I could do the
same thing and I have done the saroe, thing. I have been
dropped out of the air into places like Tokyo andl
although I do not speak a word of Japanese, with a
translator I could immediately do the same thing. Why?
How can one accomplish this extraordinary feat of’
travelling all across the planet and talk in such situations ?
Well, of course, the institutional structure is very much the
same. To use an economist’s term, Fritz Machlup’s term,
this is an institution of the knowledge industry. That is
what we make our living on. (Some of the younger people
here are aspiring to be employed by the knowledge
industry.) Now, the knowledge industry is a very
interesting phenomenon, an international phenomenon.
It is rooted in very specific institutional structures that
economists, political scientists, and so.ciologists can spell
out. I will not do it here. It has to do with, it seems to me,
certain basic structural requirements of advanced
industrial societies of a certain type, and these
requirements are the same in many countries. It is not
surprising, therefore, that people in this industry tend to
ttfink alike. There are structures of consciousness which
correlate very easily from one national branch of this
international industry to another, and once one is in this
business, one has very little difficulty in establishing
contact.
Now, modernity as a whole is stich an aggregation of’
institutional processes and structures o’fconsciousness.
One very interesting question which is raised, to which I
will come back in a moment, is to what extent these
aggregates can be disassembled. Now, as to what these
institutional processes are which are the carriers of
modernity, the carriers of modern consciousness,, there
is some debate about this and different answers have
been given. It seems to me that the major structures
are the technologised economy and the bureaucratised
state. Technology and bureaucracy, I think, are two
of t.he major institutional forces that bring about
modernisation, and both technology and bureaucracy, I
think, can be shown to have features which recur in
different national or cultural settings. In other words, they
are international phenomena and the structures of
consciousness that relate to bureaucracy and technology
are also international structures in a very real sense. That
this is true of technology is fairly obvious - an engineer
can move around the different societies, and if they have
attained a certain degree of technological development,
he can function very effectively in these societies. The
bureaucrat may have a little bit .more difficulty, for
reasons ! cannot go into now- bureaucracy has more
variability than technology- but he can also manage; he
has to learn a few tricks. People who, for example, work
for international organisations can dQ this very easily,
even, interestingly enough, across the capitalist/socialist
divide. (In some cases this divide makes much less
difference than one might think on ideological grounds:)
Tile term "carrier," as derived from Max Weber, suggests,
I suppose, a disease. But one does not have to think of it in
perjorative terms. Just as there are carriers of certain
biological conditions, thereare carriers of consciousness,
and there are carriers of modem consciousness. What I
have suggested a moment ago is that primary carriers of
modern consciousness are technology and bureaucracy.
But there are also secondary carriers; for example, new
forms of urban life which are highly institutionalised and
which carry with them certain ~structures of consciousness.
There are new structures of mass communication which
bring with them certain structures of consciousness, and
again these are diffused around the world in different
frequencies, but there are ve~ few places left in this world
where they cannot be found at all.
Let me introduce two, actually three, concepts which I
find useful in talking about this: one is the concept of’
"package," and the other is the notion of"intrinsic" and
"extrinsic" packages. What is a package? The term was
coined by Ivan Illich, but I am using it in a more precise
way than he’ did. A package is a particular empirically
available constellation of institutional and consciousness
phenomena. That is, a particular institutional process and
a particular form of consciousness empirically go
together; when this can be established, we talk about a
package. What is an extrinsic or an intrinsic package?
Very Simply, ah intrinsic package is One ~vhere we have
reason to think .that the relationship between ’the
institutional processes and the particular phenomenon of
consciousness could not be different. An extrinsic one is
where the relationship is a more accidental matter.
Take the example of aviation. It is apparently not a very
easy thing to fly a modern aeroplane; you have to be very
carefully trained. You have to be trained in certain skills.
You also have to be’ trained in certain structures of
consciousness. That is, a person who pilots a modern jet
plane has to operate both behaviourally and mentally in a
very particular way. I will not go into the details - it would
be interesting to go into the details of it, for example, to
inquire what notions of time and space are involved - but
let us agree on one simple word. The person who is
involved in this operation has to be very precise in terms of
his mental operations, and training in precision, is
extremely important. There he sits with all these gadgets
or measurements ; he has to think in a certain way. I would
suggest to you that this is an intrinsic package, that is, it
could not be imagined any differently. Let me tell you a
little episode to bring this point off. A few years ago, when
I was in Africa, I took a plane very early in the morning on
an African airline to a rather far away place. I was very
sleepy. I got on the plane and they had fitted out the cabin
to look like an African village. It was rather attractive and
there were airline hostesses in very colourful garb and they
were serving exotic food and on the P.A. system they were
playing African music. It was very early in the morning, I
was very sleepy and I was nervous, and as I walked into
this "African Village", the thought that.was in my mind
was: My God, who is flying this aeroplane? Now, please
do not interpret my remark as being some sort of racist
remark, it had nothing to do with race. I could not care
less what the skin colour was of the person who was flying
the aeroplane - I wanted the person who was flying the
aeroplane to be like a TWA pilot, to think like a TWA
pilot, and not to operate with the mental structures of an
African village which operate in very different ways from
the precise, quantifiable mathematical mindset of a pilot.
Well, what happened was we took off and the pilot got on
the P.A. system and spoke in a very clipped British voice
against the background of this African music, and I was
reassured that this individual either was British or, if not,
had been trained in Britain. That is he probably had the
mindset of a TWA pilot or British Airways ]gilot or
whatever - at least as long as he was flying the plane (I did
not care what he did when he went home and got off the
plane).
That is an intrinsic package in the sense that if you want
to take that package apart, that is institutional behaviour
and consciousness, you are not going to have an airline.
Let me spin this out for just a moment. I mentioned the
structures of time which are extremely important in
analysing consciousness. I think time is one of the basic
categories; modernisation among other ways can be
defined rather nicely as a revolution in the human
experience of time. It can also, be argued that ,the
specifically modern structure of time that goes with flying
an aeroplane is inimical to many human cultures,
certainly to traditional African cultures, and indeed if you
talk tO African writers, people who try to express an
.African consciousness, they will tell you that this is a very
alien type of consciousness and one that in many ways they
regard as a violation of their culture. Well, what can one
say when one talks about aeroplanes? As a sociologist, !
would say to such an African poet: "You may be perfectly
right, I think what you say about the Way Westerners have
organised time is very accurate. I may even agree with you
that it is a rather debatable way of living; it is very
nervous-making, for example. But unless you have it, you
are not going to have an airline, or if you have an airline,
your planes are going to crash." There is no optionhere;
it is an intrinsic package, you want an airline, you have got
to have people who feel this way, at least while they fly the
aeroplane. The interesting question is, how can you stop
them from thinking this way all the time? But that again is
a different problem.
Now, what is an extrinsic package? Let us remain with
the aeroplane example. At least .in the non-Soviet
dominated part of the world, I think in parts even there,
the language of International Civil Aviation is English
(very much to the annoyance of the French). So if you have
an African national train to be a pilot of,, an African
international airline, not only does this person have to
learn how to think mathematically and technically in a
certain way, but he has to learn English. For example, if he
comes from a Francophone African countr7, he has to
learn English or he cannot communicate with the control
towers. That is clearly an e~/trinsic package. It is the result
of an historical accident. I suppose the domination of
early international aviation by the United States, as far as I
know, is the main reason for this. English has become the
linguafranca of international aviation. It could have been
different; it could become different in the future; it could
be French, or Russian, or Chinese, or even Swahili. An
extrinsic package, it could be taken apart.
Why did I go into all of this longer than I had intended ?
It is rather simple. Modernity has come, in most parts of the
world, in a package with secularisation. Let its use the term
secularity or secularisation in as simple a form as possible.
By secularisation we mean the process by which religious
institutions and religious symbols have lost in importance.
(Believe me, I could make this infinitely more precise,
infinitely more complex, but I will not. I think "loss in
importance" is good enough.) Modernity and secularity
have been a package. I think one can show this
historically. Why has there been this package? Why has
modernisation meant secularisation? Is this package
inevitable? Or is it possible to have modernisation
without secularisation ? The last seems to me the bottom-
line question of social-scientific and historical analysis.
Why modernity has been secularising has been a topic of
debate for quite a while. Very few people have denied the
fact. There are a few people, one whom some of you
probably know, the American Catholic sociologist,
Andrew Greeley. He argues that the degree of religion
amonghuman beings has not changed appreciably since
the Stone Age. Very few people would agree with this; I
certainly would not agree. Not only has the amount of
religion, the importance of religion in the world, changed
a lot since the Stone Age, but even since lOO years ago in
most countries of the world. There has been general
agreement that modernity has meant an increase of
secularisation. There has been much less agreement as to
why this should be so. I am very much convinced that any
complex historical phenomenon is not going to have a
satisfactory monocausal explanation. I am sure there are
different reasons for this. And in this case, very much in
the tradition of Max Weber, I think that what happened in
the West, whe/-e modernity began and modern secularity
began, there was a specific confluence of historical factors.
The institutional differentiation of Western s0c~ety ~s
something that Weber. put a lot of attention to. The
Church has been a very peculiar religious institution in
human history, separate from other social institutions.
And then, of course, there has been the peculiar form of
Western rationality.
I suppose most people, whom you would ask, "why
there is less religion today than there used to be", would
answer in terms of science. I think this is almost certainly
a mistake, for the simple reason that most people do
not know a thing about, science, even in the most
technologically sophisticated Societies there is an en-
ormous ignorance of science. What it is is not Science but a
particular kind of what Max Weber called functional
rationality which is vaguely related to science but is not
science. The notions that most human problems can be
solved by the application of rational measures, that the
world is to be controlled by rational means, and beliefs of
this sort, are not science but are operating assumptions of
modernity. The spread of the highly rational structures of’
technology and bureaucracy, which ! mentioned before,
have, I think, had an important secularising effect. In
other words, the man in the Street was not all that wrong.
Secularisation has meant that religious institutions have
lost some of the predominance they used to have in some
countries and radically lost some of the social position
that they had. Religion has become a specialised activity in
the privatelives of individuals but has been driven out of
the public sphere, this is very much the case in countries
such as France, for example, the Scandinavian countries,
and in a somewhat different way the UnitedStates. In
terms of structures of consciousness, secularisation is not
just an institutional process, it is also a process within
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human consciousness, which one can describe, I thir/k, by
saying that religious definitions of reality have lost in their
subjective plausibility. That is, religious explanations of
tile world are less convincing to many people, religious
symbols have lost their power to inspire or to order
human life. What I am saying here is that many of the
common-sense assumptions about the relationship of
modernity and secularity are more or less correct. But one
factor ifi this relationship, one factor that has produced
this package of modernity and secularity, which has been
much overlooked and that I have been particularly
interested in, is the factor of pluralism~ or more
accurately, as I would prefer to call it, pluralisation. What
does that mean and why is it important?
Pluralism, as far as I know, is a term that originated in
the United States, and refers to the empirically obvious
situation that American society has been the product of a
great plurality of ethnic, racial and also religious groups.
That is not the whole story, however, and I would.suggest
to you that pluralisation takes place in countries, even
pluralisation in terms of religion, which do not at all have
the kind of heterogeneity that American society has.
Minimally, what pluralisation means is that people begin
to have the choice as to their religious affiliation, and th’is
happens even in countries with, on the surface, a very
higher degree of religious homogeneity, Sweden for
example. You have to decide whether this is true of the
Republic of Ireland. Generally speaking, modernisation
means that options are multiplied in human life. But to
put it differently, modernisatidn in terms of the basic
structures of human existence means a movement from fate to
¯ choice. This is so in terms of the elementary material
structures of life. In a Stone Age society; if you will, there
may be five tools that that particular society has. If there
are anthropologists here, I am sure they could give a list-
a certain type of hammer, a certain kind of axe, plough,
cooking utensil, whatever. Those are the tools available. If
you want to cook, you have to use this utensil, if you want
to kill somebody, you have to use the axe, and there is no
choice beyond that. Similarly, there are firm institutional
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programmes for the main activities of human lifi~:
nutrition, sexuality, child-rearing, hunting, war, whatever
tile case may be. This is the way things are done; there is
very little choice. Now, as modernisatiola proceeds, the
areas, of choice open up. They open up on the material
level. Think of the incredible, amount of gadgets and
machines and technological tools which we have available.
Am I going by caror by train? Am I going to take a plane,
am I going to take aboat? AmIgoing to use this kitchen
utensil or that? On the more sophisticated, or at least the
more complex level, the engineer chooses the difti~rent
processes that can be employed for a particular kind of
production. The same is true of institutional
arrangements which begin to vary greatly from case to
case, and both individuals and human groups have new
options. Precisely because, as a sociologist would have to
insist, human consciousness is related to institutions, this
opening up of choices also takes place on the level of
human consciousness. And what used to be fate or
destiny, now becomes increasingly a matter of choice.
I read somewhere that in Homeric Greece, if two
strangers met, one asked the other: "What gods do you
worship ?", which was not a religious question but was an
inquiry about the person’s address - where do you live?
Where you lived, that is where particular kinds of gods
were worshipped, and if you were .a Corinthian, you
worshipped the gods of Corinth, if you were an Athenian,
you worshipped the gods of Athens, and the idea that you
might be an Atheriian and not worship the gods of Athens
was an inconceivable one - at least until Socrates, and they
got rid of him in the most expeditious and logical manner.
This kind of choice-making would upset the entire system.
Through most of human history, religion was part of the
taken-for-granted unavoidable destiny of a human being,
and he or She had as little choice about the gods that one
was to worship as about a hundred other areas of human
4ire. For people in a modern society, there is this enormous
expansion of choice. I could make a list, incidentally, of
very important things that people like. What kind of
occupation am I going to follow? Whom am I going to
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marry? How am I going to raise my children? And lots of
other questions where through most of human history
there was no choice at all. We have enormous ranges of
choice. We do not all have the same. There are class
differences. But still, even the poorest person ina modern
society has choices which through most of human history
would have been unthinkable. And we now increasingly
have the choice as to which gods we worship, including the
choice not to worship any of them, which is perhaps the
most significant choice of all.
Now, when religion ceases to be a matter of fate and
becomes a matter of choice, there are some fundamental
changes in the manner in which religion is maintained in
tile consciousness of individuals. The United States, for
historical reasons that are well known, has a certain climax
of pluralism, and the American language reflects it, in a
very nice way.. I came to America as a young man, a very
young man, and one of the first things I did was to register
for college, and on one of the forms I had to fill out was
the question "What is your religious preference?" My
English was fairly good at that point, but I did not
understand the word - religious preference. It is a consumer
term: I prefer this kind of toothpaste as against that. I
prefer Presbyterianism to Methodism. Another peculiarly
American phrase: "I happen to be a Catholic," which
means I could be something else, I just happen to be a
Catholic. Or a more recent phrase, coined, as many of our
best phrases in recent years in California - I am into
Buddhism. Which implies that sooner or later I will be out
of it. Now these are linguistic terms which are very
revealing of an underlying reality which I am sure is
different, at least in some ways in Irel/md. But I would say
that Ireland is different from the United States on some
continuum of pluralism, and people in Ireland are much
closer to the United States in this matter than they would
be to people anywhere in the western world, say, ~oo years
ago, where there were very different kinds of destiny
involved in religion (very obviously Northern Ireland is a
special case, but I am not competent to discuss it).
The change can be summed up quite simply: Religion
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becomes a less certain matter. As long as the gods are taken fbr
granted, they aremy destiny, just as it is my destiny to be a
man rather than a woman, or to live in one place rather
than another, or to be the son Of a nobleman instead of
the son of a serf, or the other way round. As long as my
gods are destinyqn this sense, they have about them a high
degree of objectivity. That is, it is very unlikely that I will
doubt their existence, or for that matter, their nature, the
nature of the gods, as the tradition tells me. When the
gods become a matter of choice, they become a much less
objective reality, they become more of a subjective matter,
they become a matter of ta’ste, of opinion, of change: To
put the same thing in different terms, religious certainty
becomes a much harder-to-get commodity. I think that
the crisis that modernity has plunged religion into, the
challenge of modernity to religion, is in a very direct way
related to this transition from destiny to options, from fate
to choice. Let me come back to the question which I asked
a little bit before:~ Is this particular package, the package
of modernity and secularity, is it intrinsic or is it extrinsic?
Can we have modernity without secularisation? Or must
we assume that, .as modernisation proceeds, so will
secularisation? We.have a body of writings in the social
sciences which, perhaps, somewhat optimistically have
been called secularisation theory, optimistically because
the theory is not all that impressive and all that cohesive,
but at least there is a body of writing which suggests that
the relationship between’modernity and secularisation is
indeed intrinsic. For some of the reasons I have given, and
some others, the two would then act together inevitably,
and, therefore, one must make a certain prognosis as to
the future of religion which is a negative prognosis.
(Incidentally, this prognosis has nothing to do whether
one is oneself religious or not. If one is religious, this
would be a depressing prognosis; if one is an atheist, it
wouldbe a cheering one. But still, the prognosis would be
the same.)
When I started work in sociology in the 196os I was very
much part of this consensus. In my case it was a depressing
prognosis since I am (or should I say I happen to be, no, I
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am) a Christian and I did not like the idea that the world
would become progressively secularistic. But,
nevertheless, as a sociologist, I shared this consensus of
secularisation theory. There have been a number of
criticisms of secularisation theory which I do not think I
want to go into, but let me tell you my own view as it is
now, and it has changed somewhat since the 196os. I
think, contrary to critics like Andrew Greeley; that
secularisation has indeed been a concomitant of
modernity; it’s not an invention of some historians or
social scientists. But I am less and less inclined to see
secularisation as intrinsically linked with modernity. I think
there are historical reasons, particularly in the West, in
Europe and the European dependences around the world,
as to why that linkage was established, and it is
increasingly becoming possible, it seems to me, to see
situations in which the package might be taken apart or
disaggregated. My own change of mind, for whatever it is
worth, was mainly brought about by three sets of data, two
¯ of which were in my own experience and one was not, but
which one can read about to some extent.
One that was very much part of my own experience was
the incredible religious resurgences in America, in the
United States, .in the last fifteen years or so. In some ways
the most interesting was the one in the late ’sixties, which
was very much part of the counter culture, where suddenly
in the most unexpected social milieus you began to have
an enormous interest in religion and, generally, a rather
exotic kind of religion. Why that is so, I do not want to go
into. But in elite universities and places where one would
imagine the most secularised people of the society to exist,
(particularly in the natural sciences, by the way) there were
people who became converted to various forms of Hindu
mysticism and the like. This eruption of religiosity in the
most unlikely places - why ? Well, since then we have had a
massive religious explosion in the United States in very
different milieus but of far greater significance for the
society as a whole, and that is the new Protestant
Evangelicalism and its explosion - there is no other way to
describe it. This is an unreconstructed form of American
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Protestantism which is sweeping the country with social
and political consequences that are as yet unclear. In some
of my early writings on th~ sociology of religion of’
.American Protestantism in the late ’fifties and early
’sixties, when I started to publish things, it made much
more sense than to talk about secularisation in the United
States as progressive and inevitable (I mean progressive in
the sense of progressing, a progressing inexorable process)
than it does today where we are assailed in the United
States from every corner by masses of religious choruses of
one sort or another.
The second set of data, which I have not myself
experienced but have read about and talked about to
people who have experienced it, is the Soviet case.
Apparently there has been not a massive,.but at any rate
interesting, resurgence of religion in the Soviet Union,
and again in very, unexpected places. In some ways, I
suppose, it is analogous to what happened in the United
States and other western countries in the late ’sixties. I do
not mean the survival of traditional religion in very
traditional, milieus in, say, far-away villages, but the
upsurge of religion, to use a phrase, among the children
of the commissars, the~ sudden attendance at Orthodox
services by the most unlikely young people. The Komsomol
and the Party being troubled by religious observances
among young elite Party members, this kind of thing.
Now, one has to be careful about this in a totalitarian
society. Sociological research is very difficult. Some of this
may be using religious symbols for what is more a
cultural, a political dissidence. Still, there is enough
material there to make one interested, and, of course, the
basic interest here is that we have a societyin which for
over half a century the regime has carried on an actively
anti-religious policy, at times coupled with very severe
repression, and, nevertheless, in the very centre of the
power structure of that ’society, you will find these
religious resurgents.
The third set of data, which again were part of my own
experience ifi various places, are development in the Third
World. And if one talks about secularisation being
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coupled with modernity, you have to fbrget about the
majority of the human race. And if" you have any
experience in Asia and Africa or in Latin America (almost
anywhere, choose your Third World country), you will
find that some of’ the most dynamic and revolutionary
developments taking place are religious developments.
Let us not now go into the question of how one can
generalise about them, but you may talk about a massive
upsurge in Islam, not.just in Iran, but all over the Muslim
world and talk about religiously motivated movements in
Latin America, the incredible upsurge of new Afi~ican
types of Christianity all over the African Continent.
Certainly, whatever is happening in the Third World by
way of modernisation does not seem to be associated with
secularisation for most people, except for a very small
handful of intellectuals who, of course, were trained in the
West or by Westerners and confuse their own
consciousness with the consciousness of their fellow
citizens.
In my work on modernisation, I was compelled (I think
there is no other way of putting it) to revise my views on a.
number of things, and one thing that I think I can say I
learned (among other people, by the way, from Ivan
Illich, who has influenced me quite a lot in some of my
thinking about the Third World) is that modernisation
cannnot be understood as a unilinear development. There
is what I sometimes call the electric-toothbrush theory of
modernisation, which an amazing number of social
scientists still seem to have. The theory can be described
like this: Drop an electric toothbrush in an African village
and after 8o years you get Dusseldorf, or Stockholm or,
Detroit (you name your modern city of choice). In other
words, there is a kind of inexorable development once you
introduce one element ofmodernisation. They start to use
electric toothbrushes and, before you know it, they are all
like the Swedes, or other super-modern types. Well, this is
not true. There are obviously less simplistic ways of
looking at modernisation as a.unilinear way, but even the
less simplistic ones, I think, are not true. What in fact you
find, I think, is that the historical reality i,s a dialectic .of
17
modernisation and counter-modernisation. This has
always been so, it is nothing new, andwhen you look.back
to tile beginnings of modernity in Europe, yot/find the
same tiling.    .                 " !
The modernisation process produces very Specific
tensions, conflicts and discontents, and from the
beginning thei-e are reactions against it. Some of these
have to do with class struggles, some of them have to do
with the destruction of traditional forms of life, some of
them are on the level of consciousness, and as
modernisation proceeds, the resistances to modernisation
also proceed, and you get a see-saw development of
modernisation and counter-modernisation, with
obviously one Or the other being more prominent at a
particular moment in time. Verymuch parallel to this, it
seems to me, and relevant.to a whole range of problems of
tile modern world, there is a dialecticofsecularisation and
counter-secularisation. Iwould now continueto say as I
said ~o years ago, that modernisation is secularising, fbr
.some of the reasons I, very hastily, sketched for you. But
there are also counter-secular forces in the world which
sometimes attain enormous strength. In Western societies,
many of these have to do with class dynamics. For
example, the phenomenon ~I mentioned before, the
upsurge of Evangelical Protestantism in America--I think
much of this is, in fact, class conflict, in case there is any
misunderstanding, I amin no way a Marxist, and when I
say "class conflict", I do not mean a Marxist theory of
class but a non-Marxist theory of class. But much of what i~
going on, I think, in America under the banner of"
EvangelicM Protestantism today has to do with class
resentment and class cohflict.
From what I have said, I think you can see why
modernity poses a rather formidable challenge to any
form of traditional religion and to the institutions that
embody any form of traditional religion (the churches in
Western Christian terms certainly). There are different
ways in which these institutions: ,.an respond to that
challenge. Essentially, I would say, there is a three-fold
typology that one can use. Like all typologies this is
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arguable, but it helps to order the data. One obviously is
counter-modern resistance, the effort to keep that
dynamics out as far as possible. I think it is fair to say that,
certainly in the nineteenth century and into the twentieth
century, that was the predominant stance of the Roman
Catholic Church. To me one of the most magnificent
symbols of this (I am not Roman Catholic, I have no
theological admiration for this, neither do most Catholic
theologians today) was in 187o, a few months after the
troops of Victor Emmanuel marched into Rome uniting
Rome to Italy, carrying on their bayonets all the modern
virtues of nineteenth century liberalism. Just a few months
after that, Vatican I pronounced the i’nfallibility of the’
Pope, in the teeth of the modern world. There is a certain
magnificence in this even, if one does not believe that the
Pope is infallible, which I do not. It is a magnificent
gesture. It is a gesture, of course, of resistance, of defiance,
and less grandiose institutions than the Roman Catholic
Church have tried this. In the United States, a few years
ago, the Missouri Synod,. one of the largest Lutheran
bodies in the United States, fired most of the theological
faculty of their seminary. They fired the Old Testament
professor because he taOght that Jonah was not literally
swallowed by the whale; this was about 1975. Now there is
something magnificent about this, for an American
church body today to fire a professor because he does not
believe in such miracles. But there are technical.problems
with this stance, largely of a sociological sort which I could
spell out. There ar,.e problems of social engineering. In
order to make that kind of stance plausible you have to
have a certain kind of social structure, and that is very
difficult to maintain in a modern Western society.
"At the opposite end of’ttiis is what one can call
secularising adaptation, in which the tradition is adapted,
as far as possible, to modern secularity. The terms of the
tradition are translated into secular terms. Individual
theologians, of course, do this. Schools of theology and,
to some extent, entire denominations have done it. As far
as. possible they translate the traditional message into
terms that would be congenial to modern man. This, I
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think, is also a very difficult procedure, because essentially
one does not know where to stop, and as you translate the
tradition into modern terms, you find, sometimes very
rapidly, that there is nothing left of the tradition, and what
began as a way of making it survive, becomes a way of"
liquidating it. The viable choices are in between these t,~,o
extremes they are, if I may use a technical term of my own,
options of "cognitive bargaining," in which the tradition
tries to maintain itself as the tradition that it has been but
in a kind of bargaining stance vis-d-vis modernity. My own
view is, as a sociologist, that only this third option has any
chance of success, happily, this happens to agree with my
theological prejudices, so I am not distressed by that
conclusion.                        ,         ’
